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Inconsistency-tolerant Integrity Checking
Hendrik Decker and Davide Martinenghi
Abstract— All methods for efficient integrity checking require
all integrity constraints to be totally satisfied, before any update is
executed. However, a certain amount of inconsistency is the rule,
rather than the exception in databases. In this paper, we close
the gap between theory and practice of integrity checking, i.e.,
between the unrealistic theoretical requirement of total integrity
and the practical need for inconsistency tolerance, which we
define for integrity checking methods. We show that most of them
can still be used to check whether updates preserve integrity, even
if the current state is inconsistent. Inconsistency-tolerant integrity
checking proves beneficial both for integrity preservation and
query answering. Also, we show that it is useful for view updating,
repairs, schema evolution and other applications.
Index Terms— Integrity Checking, Inconsistency Tolerance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Integrity constraints are statements declared in the database
schema. They express semantic properties, meant to be invariably
satisfied by the stored data across state changes.
For preserving the satisfaction of simple constraints like pri-
mary keys, foreign keys, or CHECK constraints, sufficient support
is usually provided by the database management system (DBMS).
For constraints that are not supported by the DBMS, the majority
of scientific publications on the subject proposes to use some au-
tomated, application-independent method for integrity checking.
Each such method takes as input the set of constraints in the
schema, an update consisting of two (possibly empty) sets of data-
base elements to be inserted or, respectively, deleted, and possibly
the current, also called ‘old’ state of the database. The output
of the methods indicates whether the ‘new’ state, obtained from
updating the old state, would satisfy or violate integrity.
In theory, each method requires the total integrity of the old
state, i.e., no violation whatsoever is tolerated at any time. Total
integrity, however, is the exception, rather than the rule in practice.
Integrity violation may sneak into a database in many ways. For
instance, new constraints may be added without being checked
for violations by legacy data. Or, integrity control may be turned
off temporarily, e.g., when uploading a backup for which a
total check would last too long. Or, integrity may deteriorate by
migrating to the DBMS of a different vendor, since the semantics
of integrity constructs tends to be proprietary. Or, integrity may
be compromised by the integration of databases, when constraints
that had held locally fail to hold after databases have been merged.
Other database applications where inconsistencies may occur
are view updating, schema evolution, data mining and warehous-
ing, diagnosis, replication, uncertain data, and many more.
Often, users consider efforts to completely repair all incon-
sistencies unnecessary, inopportune, unaffordable or impossible.
Violations of constraints may even be desirable, e.g., when
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constraints are used to detect irregularities, such as indications of
security attacks, tax dodging, etc. So, even though the standard
logic foundations are intolerant wrt. inconsistency, there is a
strong practical need for integrity checking methods that are able
to tolerate extant cases of constraint violations.
For convenience, we abbreviate, from now on, inconsistency-
tolerant integrity checking by ITIC.
Fortunately, no new methods for ITIC have to be invented.
The main purpose of this paper is to show that the gap between
theory and practice of integrity checking can be closed by already
approved, time-tested methods. Contrary to common belief, these
methods can waive the unrealistic requirement of total integrity
satisfaction, without forfeiting their capacity to check integrity,
even in the presence of inconsistency. Our approach to ITIC yields
major quality improvements, both of data wrt. their intended
semantics, and of answers to queries.
The aims pursued in this paper are the following.
1) To distinguish methods that are inconsistency-tolerant from
those that are not. In this paper, we formalize the notion of ITIC.
Before that, the behavior of methods for checking declaratively
stated constraints in the presence of inconsistency has never been
contemplated. Traditionally, integrity checking methods were not
legitimized to be used in the presence of inconsistency, although
many databases are not totally consistent. Now, inconsistency-
tolerant methods can be soundly used in the presence of an
arbitrary amount of inconsistency. Thus, the applicability of
integrity checking methods is widened immensely. To the best
of our knowledge, our definition is the first of its kind.
2) To bridge the gap between theory and practice of integrity
checking by using inconsistency tolerance. The theoretical total-
integrity requirement is a formidable desideratum in practice.
Typically, practical approaches to deal with extant inconsistency
are based on exception handling. They tend to have the character
of workarounds or ad-hoc solutions. Theoretical approaches to
deal with extant inconsistency have been based on non-classical
logics such as modal, many-valued or paraconsistent calculi. Our
approach is based on classical logic and does not need any
changes or adaptations of existing integrity checking methods.
3) To evaluate the effects of ITIC on database evolution
and query answering. Ultimately, integrity checking is about
preserving the semantics of data through updates and, conse-
quently, obtaining query answers that can be trusted. Without
total integrity, full trustability is lost. Yet, some databases may
be less inconsistent than others, and thus better behaved wrt.
query answering. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive set of
experiments for observing the impact of ITIC on databases subject
to evolution through updates. We report both on the number of
constraint violations and on the number of incorrect answers to
complex benchmark queries. We also compare our approach to
consistent query answering [1], which is an orthogonal technique
for dealing with inconsistent data.
4) To describe several application contexts that may benefit
from ITIC. The vision brought forward in this paper can be applied
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to various knowledge and data management problems. We show
that ITIC naturally extends to view updates, database repairs,
schema evolution, risk management, and unsatisfiability handling.
Section II outlines the background. The main contributions are:
to develop a concept of ITIC (Section III), to show the inconsis-
tency tolerance of known methods (Section IV), to outline several
applications of ITIC (Section V), and to validate the practical
relevance of ITIC (Section VI). Related work is discussed in
Section VII. In Section VIII, we conclude.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We adopt the usual terminology and notation of datalog, and
refer to textbooks in the field (e.g., [2]) for further background.
A. Logic and Databases
Throughout, let symbols a, b, . . . denote constants, p, q, . . .
predicates and x, y, . . . variables. A term is either a variable
or a constant. Sequences of terms are denoted as vectors, e.g., t.
Predicates, terms, logical connectives ∼,∧,∨,←, 0-ary predicates
true, false, and quantifiers ∀, ∃ are used in formulas, defined as
follows: i) if p is an n-ary predicate and t1, . . . , tn are terms then
p(t1, . . . , tn) is a formula; ii) if F and G are formulas then so
are ∼F , F ∧G, F ∨G, F ← G; iii) if F is a formula and x a
variable such that neither ∀x nor ∃x occurs in F , then ∀xF and
∃xF are formulas; in ∀xF and ∃xF , each occurrence of x in F
is said to be bound. A formula in which all variables are bound is
said to be closed. A formula preceded by ∼ is said to be negated.
Formulas of the form p(t1, . . . , tn), where p is a predicate and the
ti are terms, are called atoms. A literal is either an atom (positive
literal) or a negated atom (negative literal).
An expression is either a formula or a term. A substitution σ is
a set of pairs of terms {x1/t1, . . . , xn/tn}, where x1, . . . , xn are
distinct variables; let {x1, . . . , xn} be denoted by Dom(σ). The
restriction of a substitution σ to a set of variables V ⊆ Dom(σ)
is the substitution σ′ ⊆ σ such that Dom(σ′) = V .
For an expression E (or a set of expressions E) and a substitu-
tion σ, the expression Eσ (Eσ) be obtained by replacing each
occurrence of each variable from Dom(σ) in E (E) by the
corresponding term in σ. An expression is called ground if it
contains no variable. A substitution σ is more general than a
substitution θ if there is a substitution φ such that, for each
expression E, Eθ = (Eσ)φ. A substitution σ is a unifier of
expressions E1, . . . , En if E1σ = · · · = Enσ; σ is a most
general unifier (mgu) of E1, . . . , En if σ is more general than
any other unifier of E1, . . . , En.
A clause is a formula of the form H ← B1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bn
(n≥ 0), where H is a positive literal, B1, . . . , Bn are literals and,
implicitly, each variable in H ← B1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bn is universally
quantified in front of the clause. H is called the head and
B1 ∧ · · · ∧Bn the body of the clause. The head is optional; when
absent, the clause is called a denial, and its body can be read as
a condition that must not hold. The empty clause is a denial with
an empty body; it is equivalent to false. A fact is a clause whose
head is ground and whose body is empty.
A database clause is a clause with non-empty head
H /∈{true, false}. A database is a finite set of database clauses.
The dependency graph DD of a database D is a directed graph
such that its nodes are labeled with the predicates in D, and there
is a positive (resp., negative) arc (p, q) in DD for each clause
H ← B in D and each pair of predicates p, q such that q occurs
in H and p in a positive (resp., negative) literal in B. A database
D is relational if each clause in D is a fact; D is hierarchical
if no cycle exists in DD , i.e., no predicate recurs on itself; D is
stratified if no cycle with a negative arc exists in DD , i.e., no
predicate recurs on its own negation.
An update is a bipartite finite set of clauses to be deleted and
inserted, respectively. For a database D and an update U , let DU
denote the updated database; we also call D and DU the old and
the new state, respectively. For a fact A in U to be inserted or
deleted, we may write “insert A” or, resp., “delete A”.
B. Integrity
We are going to formalize basic notions of database integrity.
1) Syntax: An integrity constraint (in short constraint) is a
closed first-order predicate logic formula. As usual, constraints
are represented either a denials or in prenex conjunctive normal
form (PCNF), i.e., formulas of the form I = QI ′, where Q is a
sequence of quantified variables Q1x1 . . . Qnxn, each Qi is either
∀ or ∃, and the so-called matrix I ′ is a conjunction of disjunctions
of literals.
A variable x in a constraint I is called a global variable in I
if x is ∀-quantified and ∃ does not occur left of ∀x in the PCNF
of I. Let Glb(I) denote the set of global variables in I.
An integrity theory is a finite set of integrity constraints.
2) Semantics: We use true and false also to denote truth values.
We only consider databases that have a two-valued semantics,
given by a unique standard model, e.g., stratified databases with
the stable model semantics [3]. That also determines the semantics
of integrity, as follows.
Let I be a constraint, IC an integrity theory, and D a database.
We write D(I) = true (resp., D(IC) = true) and say that I (resp.,
IC) is satisfied in D if I (resp., each constraint in IC) is true in
D. Else, we write D(I) = false (resp., D(IC) = false) and say
that I (resp., IC) is violated in D.
In the literature, the semantics of integrity is not always defined
by the truth or falsity of constraints, as in the preceding definition.
For instance, the “consistency view” in [4] defines satisfaction
not by truth, but by satisfiability. The “theoremhood view” in
[5] defines that a constraint is violated if it is not true, which
does not necessarily mean that it is false, e.g., in the completion
of databases with predicates defined by recurring on themselves.
The preceding definition avoids such incongruences, as long as
only databases with a unique two-valued model are considered.
3) Soundness and Completeness: Each integrity checking
method M can be formalized as a function that takes as input a
database, an integrity theory and an update, and outputs either sat
or vio. To compute this function usually is much more efficient
than the brute-force method, henceforth denoted by Mbf , which
exhaustively evaluates all constraints upon each update.
The soundness and completeness of integrity checking methods
can now be generically defined as follows.
Definition 2.1: [Sound and complete integrity checking]
An integrity checking method M is called sound or, resp., com-
plete, if, for each database D, each integrity theory IC such that
D(IC) = true, and each update U , (1) or, resp., (2) holds.
If M(D, IC, U) = sat then DU (IC) = true . (1)
If DU (IC) = true then M(D, IC, U) = sat . (2)
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Definition 2.1 only states soundness and completeness prop-
erties for the output sat of M. Symmetrically, soundness and
completeness properties for the output vio could be defined. We
refrain from doing so, since, under the additional condition that
M terminates, it is easy to show that soundness and completeness
for sat is equivalent to completeness and, resp., soundness for vio.
Soundness, completeness and termination have been shown for
the methods in [6], [5], [4], [7] and others. Other methods (e.g.,
[8], [9]) are only shown to be sound. Thus, they provide sufficient
but not necessary conditions for guaranteeing integrity.
4) Simplifications: Most methods for efficient integrity check-
ing attemp to “simplify” the constraints that are potentially
violated by an update U , so that computingM(D, IC, U) becomes
more efficient than querying all constraints by brute force.
Example 2.1: Let p(ISBN ,TITLE) be a relation with predi-
cate p about published books, and I the constraint
← p(x, y) ∧ p(x, z) ∧ y = z .
I states that no two books with the same ISBN may have different
titles. Let U be an update that inserts p(i, t). For any database D,
most methods M compute M(D, {I}, U) by evaluating D(I ′),
where I ′ is the simplified constraint ← p(i, y) ∧ y = t. It states
that no book with ISBN i may have a title different from t. If
M is sound (and complete), the new state DU is guaranteed to
satisfy I if (and, resp., only if) DU (I ′) = true. 
Such simplifications typically yield major gains in efficiency, as
can be seen by comparing I and I ′ in Example 2.1. For any given
update pattern, simplifications can be generated even without
depending on any database state, but only on the schema and
the integrity theory. Thus, database performance is not affected,
since simplifications can be anticipated ahead of update time.
For instance, take i and t in Example 2.1 as placeholders for
actual ISBNs and titles. For the insertion of a concrete fact, e.g.
p(17, abc), values 17 and abc replace i and, resp., t in I ′. The
cost of checking the resulting simplification then is that of a table
look-up, while the brute-force evaluation of I would be quadratic
in the size of the extension of p (if no index is used).
III. INCONSISTENCY TOLERANCE IN INTEGRITY CHECKING
The motivation behind this paper is the need for methods that
are capable of checking constraints without insisting on total
integrity satisfaction. No method has ever been defined without
requiring total integrity, which was thought of as indispensable.
However, inconsistencies often are unavoidable, or even useful
(e.g., for diagnosis, or mining fraudulent data). Thus, extant cases
of violated constraints should be tolerable. Nonetheless, integrity
checking should prevent that any new cases of integrity violation
are introduced. That is captured by the definitions in III-A.
A. The Main Definitions
The goal of this section is to characterize methods that can
tolerant extant cases of constraint violation in databases. For
attaining that goal, we first formalize what we mean by “case”.
Definition 3.1: [Case]
Let I be a constraint and σ a substitution. Iσ is called a case of
I if Dom(σ) = Glb(I); it is a basic case if Glb(Iσ) = ∅. For a
database D and an integrity theory IC, let S(D, IC) denote the
set of all cases C of all constraints in IC such that D(C) = true.
Example 3.1: Consider two relations with predicates r, s, and
the foreign key constraint I = ∀x, y ∃z(s(x, y) → r(x, z)) on the
first argument of s, which references a primary key, the first
argument of r. The global variables of I are x and y. For a fact
s(a, b) to be inserted, integrity checking methods usually focus
on the (basic) case ∃z(s(a, b) → r(a, z)) of I. It requires the
existence of a fact in r whose primary key value matches the
foreign key value of the inserted fact. Other cases are ignored. 
Example 3.1 illustrates the crucial role of cases for ITIC.
Intuitively, at most those cases whose global variables match with
values of the update need to be checked. All other cases can be
ignored, even if they are violated. Most methods in the literature
and in practice work that way: they focus on cases that may
be violated by updated facts, while ignoring extant violations.
However, the traditional theory of simplified integrity checking,
anchored in Definition 2.1, does not reflect that focus. Rather, it
coarsely treats each constraint I as either satisfied or violated. It
does not consider that, e.g., only a few, tolerable cases of I may
be violated, while all others are satisfied. The following definition
does.
Definition 3.2: [Inconsistency-tolerant integrity checking]
An integrity checking methodM is sound or, resp., complete wrt.
inconsistency tolerance if, for each database D, each integrity
theory IC, and each update U , (3) or, resp., (4) holds.
If M(D, IC, U) = sat then S(D, IC) ⊆ S(DU , IC). (3)
If S(D, IC) ⊆ S(DU , IC) then M(D, IC, U) = sat . (4)
As opposed to the traditional Definition 2.1, Definition 3.2 does
not require total integrity, i.e., it may well be that D(IC) = false.
However, in both definitions, the same function M(D, IC, U)
is used for integrity checking. Thus, no new method needs to
be invented for achieving inconsistency tolerance. Rather, any
traditional method can be employed if it complies with (3).
Example 3.2: Let I be as in Example 2.1. Let D con-
sist of p(1, a) and p(1, b). Clearly, D(I) = false. Let U =
{insert p(2, c)}. The simplification ← p(2, y)∧y = c, as obtained
in Example 2.1, is true in DU . Each method M that evaluates
this simplification outputs sat, i.e., U is accepted because it does
not introduce any violation of integrity. Thus, M guarantees that
all cases of I that were satisfied in D remain satisfied in DU ,
while tolerating the inconsistency of violated cases of I. 
Several non-trivial examples and counter-examples for Defini-
tion 3.2 are featured in section IV. A trivial example of a method
that is sound wrt. inconsistency tolerance isMbf . However,Mbf
is not complete wrt. inconsistency tolerance, as shown below.
Example 3.3: Let D, I and U be as in Example 3.2. Clearly,
Mbf (D, {I}, U) = vio, but the only violated basic case of I in
DU , ← p(1, a) ∧ p(1, b) ∧ a = b, was already violated in D. 
Theorem 1 below states that ITIC generalizes the traditional
approach which insists on total integrity. The generalization is
proper, i.e., some but not all methods are inconsistency-tolerant,
as we shall see in IV-D.
Theorem 1: Let M be a method for integrity checking.
Then, for each database D, each integrity theory IC such that
D(IC) = true, and each update U , the implications (3) ⇒ (1)
and (4) ⇒ (2) hold.
Proof: To show (3) ⇒ (1), note that D(IC) = true entails
IC ⊆ S(D, IC). Hence, if (3) holds and M(D, IC, U) = sat, the
conclusion of (3) entails DU (C) = true for each C ∈ IC. Hence
(1) follows. Similarly, (4) ⇒ (2) can be shown.
Theorem 1 entails that relaxing traditional integrity checking
(which requires total integrity) to ITIC causes no loss of efficiency
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and no extra cost at all. On the other hand, the gains are immense:
with an inconsistency-tolerant method, database operations can
proceed even in the presence of (obvious or hidden, known or
unknown) violations of integrity. As opposed to that, integrity
checking was traditionally not legitimate in the presence of con-
straint violations, i.e., it had to wait until integrity was repaired.
Example 3.4 below illustrates another advantage of ITIC: each
update that does not introduce any new case of integrity violation
can be accepted, while extant violated cases may disappear,
intentionally or accidentally.
Example 3.4: Let D and I be as in Example 3.2, and let
U = {delete p(1, b)}. Since D(I) = false, no method that insists
on total integrity is in the position to check this update. How-
ever, each inconsistency-tolerant method is. Each method that is
complete wrt. inconsistency tolerance (and in fact each method
assessed in Section IV) returns sat for this example, since U
does not introduce any new violation of I. Since U even repairs a
violated constraint, there are several reasons to accept this update,
and the lack of total integrity is no reason to reject it. 
B. Sufficient and Necessary Conditions
We are now going to discuss conditions that will be used for
assessing the inconsistency tolerance of methods in section IV.
Conditions (5) and (6) below are sufficient for soundness (3) and,
resp., completeness (4), as shown in Theorem 2. Later, (8), which
is also interesting on its own, is shown to be necessary for (4).
If M(D, IC, U) = sat
then, for each C ∈ S(D, IC), M(D, {C}, U) = sat (5)
If, for each C ∈ S(D, IC), M(D, {C}, U) = sat
then M(D, IC, U) = sat (6)
Theorem 2: Let M be a sound method for integrity checking.
Then, for each database D, each integrity theory IC, the implica-
tions (5) ⇒ (3) and (6) ⇒ (4) hold.
Proof: By applying (1), the “then” part of (5) becomes
for each C ∈ S(D, IC), DU (C) = sat, (7)
which is the same as S(D, IC) ⊆ S(DU , IC), hence the thesis.
Similarly, applying (1) on the “if” part of (6) yields (4).
In Section IV, condition (5) is verified for the methods in [6],
[5], [4], and (6) is verified for [6]. Interestingly, we are going
to see that many other methods turn out to not fulfill (4), since,
e.g., they may output vio whenever an update yields a redundant
new path for deriving some already violated case. So, if the update
causes no other violation of integrity, the premise of (4) holds, but
its conclusion does not. In other words, the output vio of methods
that are sound but incomplete wrt. inconsistency tolerance does
not guarantee that the given update would violate a case of
some constraint that was satisfied in the old state. However, the
following, somewhat weaker property holds for several methods.
Definition 3.3: [Weakly complete inconsistency tolerance]
Let M be a method for integrity checking. M is called weakly
complete wrt. inconsistency tolerance if, for each database D,
each integrity theory IC and each update U , the following holds.
If DU (IC) = true then M(D, IC, U) = sat . (8)
The technical difference between (2) and (8) is that, for (2),
total integrity of the old state is required, but not for (8).
In practice, weak completeness wrt. inconsistency tolerance is
a desirable property: The output vio of any sound but incomplete
TABLE I
PROPERTIES OF INTEGRITY CHECKING METHODS
MN MLST MSK MG MCM
sound for int. check. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
complete for int. check. Yes Yes Yes No Yes
sound wrt. inc. tol. Yes Yes Yes No Yes∗
complete wrt. inc. tol. Yes weakly weakly No No
∗ For singleton integrity theories
integrity checking method means that further checking is needed
for deciding if the update preserves or violates integrity. However,
the contraposition of (8) ensures that, if a weakly complete
method outputs vio, integrity surely is violated after the update,
i.e., no further checking is needed. In fact, it is easy to show the
following direct consequences of Definitions 2.1, 3.2 and 3.3.
Corollary 3: Let M be a method for integrity checking.
a) If M is complete wrt. inconsistency tolerance, then it is also
weakly complete wrt. inconsistency tolerance ((4) ⇒ (8)).
b) If M is weakly complete wrt. inconsistency tolerance, then it
is also a complete integrity checking method ((8) ⇒ (2)).
IV. ASSESSMENT OF INTEGRITY CHECKING METHODS
As seen in section III, the differences between traditional
integrity checking and ITIC are quite subtle. However, it would
be wrong to think that inconsistency tolerance was for free or
marginal. In this section, we assess five methods to determine
if they are or are not inconsistency-tolerant, spanning from the
seminal work by Nicolas [6] to more recent ones.
The result that many, though not all well-known methods are
inconsistency-tolerant is of utmost practical significance, since
each simplification method hitherto has been believed to be dis-
capacitated, hence useless, in the presence of inconsistency. To
show that several methods continue to function well even if
integrity is violated thus breaks radically with all expectations.
Without this result, there would be no justification at all for using
integrity checking methods in inconsistent databases.
We chose methods [6], [5], [4] due to their impact on subse-
quent works. In particular, [6] initiated and popularized the notion
of simplification. Its extensions in [5] and [4] have generalized
integrity checking to datalog. A lot more extensions have ap-
peared. Since it is unfeasible to discuss them all, we have chosen
just two more methods. (Others are analyzed in [10].) One is from
the 1990’s [8]. It excels for constraints that lend themselves to
optimizations related to query containment [11]. The other is from
the 2000’s [7]. It generates provably optimal simplifications, and
generalizes previous methods that evaluate their simplifications
in the old (instead of the new) state. Thus, costly rollbacks of
updates that violate integrity are avoided. Table I summarizes the
properties of the methods assessed in this section.
A. The Method of Nicolas
We are going to show that the well-known method for integrity
checking by Nicolas [6], henceforth denoted by MN , is sound
and complete wrt. inconsistency tolerance.
We adopt the notation Γ+f,I from [6]. For a database D, a
constraint I = QI ′ in PCNF and a fact f to be inserted, MN
generates the simplification
Γ+f,I =
Q(I ′γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ I ′γm) (m ≥ 0) (9)
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where the γi are unifiers, restricted to Glb(I), of f and the m
different occurrences of negated atoms in I unifying with f . Then,
each occurrence of f in Γ+f,I is replaced by true in Γ
+
f,I , which is
then further simplified by standard rewritings. Symmetrically, for
a fact f to be deleted, a simplification obtained by instantiating
I with restricted unifiers of f and non-negated occurrences of
matches of f , is generated. For simplicity, we only deal with
insertions here; result and proof wrt. deletions are symmetrical.
Under the total integrity premise D(I) = true, the simplifica-
tion theorem in [6] states that DU (I) = true iff DU (Γ+f,I) = true.
Example 4.1: Let I and U be as in Example 2.1. A PCNF of
I is
∀x∀y ∀z (∼p(x, y) ∨ ∼p(x, z) ∨ y = z) .
Clearly, p(i, t) unifies with two atoms in I, by unifiers {x/i, y/t}
and {x/i, z/t}. The simplification Γ+
p(i,t),I
returned by MN is
∀x∀y ∀z (∼p(i, t)∨∼p(i, z)∨ t=z) ∧ (∼p(i, y)∨∼p(i, t)∨ y=t).
Since the two conjuncts are obviously equivalent, one of them
can be dropped, yielding ∀x ∀y (∼p(i, y) ∨ ∼p(i, t) ∨ y = t).
Then, replacing p(i, t) by true and dropping the corresponding
disjunct yields the same simplification as in Example 2.1.
It is worth noting that each simplification step above is believed
to be valid in [6] (and in fact in all the rest of the literature on
integrity checking methods) only if I is satisfied in the old state.
Theorem 4 rebuts this belief by confirming that the simplifications
are valid also if I is violated in the old state. 
Theorem 4 (Inconsistency tolerance of MN ): MN is sound
and complete wrt. inconsistency tolerance in relational databases.
Proof: Let D be a relational database, IC an integrity theory
and U an update. For the proof below, we assume that IC is sin-
gleton and U = insert f , for some fact f /∈D. A symmetric proof
for deletions and straightforward extensions to multiple updates
and constraints are omitted. In part a), we show soundness, in b)
completeness.
a) Soundness: Let I = QI ′ be an integrity constraint in PCNF
with matrix I ′, Γ+f,I the simplification of MN for I and U , σ a
substitution such that Dom(σ) = Glb(I), and D(Iσ) = true. We
have to show that DU (Iσ) = true if DU (Γ+f,I) = true. According
to Theorem 2, it suffices to show:
If DU (Γ+f,I) = true then D
U (Γ+f,Iσ) = true
where Γ+f,Iσ is the simplification of Iσ byMN . For each conjunct
J in Γ+f,Iσ , there is a negated atom g in I such that gσβ = gγ = f ,
where β and γ are the substitutions used to compute Γ+f,Iσ and,
resp., Γ+f,I . Thus, J = I




b) Completeness: We show the following contrapositive claim:
If MN (D, I, U) = vio then there is a case C of I
such that D(C) = true and DU (C) = false .
(10)
Assume MN (D, I, U) = vio. We distinguish D(I) = true and
D(I) = false. If D(I) = true, then DU (I) = false, since MN is
complete for integrity checking. Hence, (10) follows.
Now, let D(I) = false. Since MN reports a violation, there is
a conjunct I ′γ in Γ+f,I such that C = Q(I
′γ) is violated in DU ,
where γ is a unifier of f and a negative literal in I. Thus, one of
the disjuncts in I ′γ is a negated occurrence of f . Since f /∈ D,
D(C) = true holds. Hence (10) follows.
B. The Method of Lloyd, Sonenberg and Topor
We are going to show that the integrity checking method in
[5], here denoted by MLST , is sound and weakly complete wrt.
inconsistency tolerance.
In [5], two sets posD,D′ and negD,D′ are defined that capture
the difference between any two databases D and D′ such that
D ⊆ D′. The sets consist of atoms that either are the head of
some clause in the update U = D′ \D or the head of a clause in
D that is possibly affected by reasoning forward from clauses in
U . In particular, posD,D′ captures a superset of the facts that are
actually inserted, i.e., provable after the update but not before,
and negD,D′ a superset of the facts that are actually deleted, i.e.,
provable before but not after the update.
Let D be a stratified database and U an update that preserves
stratification. Applying the deletions in U to D leads to an
intermediate state D′′. Then, applying the insertions in U to D′′
leads to the updated state D′ = DU . It is shown in [5] that
posD′′,D′ ∪negD′′,D captures a superset of facts that are actually
inserted, and negD′′,D′ ∪ posD′′,D captures a superset of facts
that are actually deleted by U .
Thus, the principles for identifying all relevant, i.e., potentially
violated constraints, as established in [6], apply as follows. Only
those atoms in posD′′,D′ ∪ negD′′,D that unify with the atom
of a negative literal in I by some mgu φ capture a possibly
inserted fact that may violate integrity. That is checked by
evaluating Q(I ′φ′), where φ′ is the restriction of φ to Glb(I),
and I ′ the matrix of I. Symmetrically, only those atoms in
negD′′,D′ ∪posD′′,D that unify with the atom of a positive literal
in I by some mgu φ capture a possibly deleted fact that may
violate integrity. That is then checked by evaluating the case
Q(I ′φ′) of I, where φ′ is defined as above.
Let Φ(I, D, U) denote the set of all such substitutions φ′
for identifying relevant constraints. Assuming the total integrity
premise D(I) = true, the simplification theorem in [5] states that,
for any stratified database D and update U preserving stratifica-
tion, DU (I) = true iff, for all φ ∈ Φ(I, D, U), DU ( Q(I ′φ)) =
true.
Example 4.2: Let D consist of the four clauses
p(x, y)← q(x) ∧ r(y), r(b),
p(x, y)← s(y, x), s(b, a),
I =←p(x, a) and U = {insert q(a)}. Clearly, D(I) = true.MLST
generates Φ(I, D, U) = {x/a}, indicating that some fact matching
p(a, y) may violate I. Thus, the simplification to be evaluated is
← p(a, a). Hence,MLST (D, {I}, U) = sat. By the soundness of
MLST , DU (I) = true follows.
Note thatMLST (D, {I}, U) = sat also if s(a, b)∈D. That high-
lights the inconsistency tolerance of MLST , as stated below. 
Theorem 5 (Inconsistency tolerance of MLST ): MLST is
sound wrt. inconsistency tolerance in stratified databases.
Proof: Let D be a stratified database, I = QI ′ be a
constraint in PCNF with matrix I ′, I∗ = Q(I ′ζ) a case of I,
and U an update preserving stratification. Assume D(I∗) = true.
We have to show that DU (I∗) = true if DU ( Q(I ′φ)) = true, for
all φ ∈ Φ(I, D, U). That follows from (5) and lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.1: DU ( Q(I ′ζφ∗)) = true for all φ∗ ∈ Φ(I∗, D, U)
if DU ( Q(I ′φ)) = true for all φ ∈ Φ(I, D, U).
This lemma is a direct consequence of the following one.
Lemma 4.2: For each substitution φ∗ ∈ Φ(I∗, D, U) there is a
substitution φ ∈ Φ(I, D, U) that is more general than φ∗.
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Proof: Each φ∗ ∈ Φ(I∗, D, U) either originates from a
potentially inserted atom A that unifies with a negated atom A∗ in
I∗ or a potentially deleted atom B that unifies with a non-negated
atom B∗ in I∗. Since I∗ is a case of I, there is a negated atom
A′ (or a non-negated atom B′, resp.) in I such that A∗ = A′ζ
(B∗ = B′ζ, resp.). Thus, A (B, resp.) a fortiori unifies with A′
(B′, resp.), by some mgu φ that is more general than φ∗.
The method MLST is not complete wrt. inconsistency toler-
ance, as shown by the following counter-example.
Example 4.3: For the same D, I and U as in Example 4.2, let
D∗ = D ∪ {s(a, a)}. Clearly, ← p(a, a) is a violated case in D∗;
all other basic cases of I are satisfied in D∗. Although U does not
introduce any new violated case in (D∗)U ,MLST still generates
the simplification ← p(a, a). Thus, MLST (D∗, {I}, U) = vio.
Hence, by Def. 3.2, MLST is not complete wrt. inconsistency
tolerance. Yet, we have the following result. 
Theorem 6 (Weak completeness ofMLST ): MLST is weakly
complete wrt. inconsistency tolerance in stratified databases.
Proof: Let D be a stratified database, IC an integrity
theory and U an update. We have to show that DU (IC) = true
entails MLST (D, IC, U) = sat. If DU (IC) = true, then there is a
refutation of ← I ′ in DU for each case I ′ of each constraint I in
IC. Since each simplification of I checked by MLST is a case
of I, it follows that MLST (D, IC, U) = sat.
C. The Method of Sadri & Kowalski
We are going to show that the integrity checking method in
[4], here denoted by MSK , is sound and weakly complete wrt.
inconsistency tolerance.
Roughly, MSK works as follows. Each integrity theory IC is
a set of denials. Each update U may include denials. Denials to be
deleted cannot violate integrity and thus are simply dropped from
IC: let IC− = IC \ {I : delete I ∈ U}. Denials to be inserted are
queried in the new state. If any of them is refuted,MSK outputs
vio. Else, for checking if any other clause in U would cause
integrity violation, MSK computes an update U ′, consisting of
all clauses in U to be inserted and all ground negative literals
∼H such that H is true in D and false in DU . For each T ∈U ′,
MSK builds a resolution tree rooted at T , using input clauses
from DU∪ IC−. For each derivation δ in the tree, each step taken
in δ is either a standard backward-reasoning step, or a forward-
reasoning step from the literal selected in the head of T or of any
clause derived from T by previous steps in δ. In forward steps,
the selected literal is resolved with a matching literal in the body
of some input clause. If any such derivation yields a refutation,
MSK outputs vio. If the tree is finitely failed,MSK outputs sat.
Theorem 7 (Inconsistency tolerance ofMSK): MSK is sound
wrt. inconsistency tolerance in stratified databases.
Proof: Let D be a stratified database, IC an integrity theory
and U an update such that MSK(D, IC, U) = sat. Further, let
IC− and U ′ be as described above. We have to show that, for
each C ∈ S(D, IC−), DU (C) = true. By Theorem 2, it suffices
to verify (5), i.e. that for each C0 ∈U ′, MSK builds a finitely
failed tree TC , rooted at C0, with input from DU∪{C}.
Let C ∈ S(D, IC−), i.e., for some I ∈ IC−, C = Iσ, for
some substitution σ of Glb(I). Further, let C0 ∈U ′. Since
MSK(D, IC−, U) = sat, there is a finitely failed tree T in the
search space ofMSK , rooted at C0, built with input clauses from
DU ∪ IC−. From T , TC is obtained as follows.
Each derivation δ in T is replaced, if possible, by the following
derivation δ′ in TC . It starts from the same root as δ. For each i,
0≤ i < n, where n is the length of δ, the i+1-th resolvent of δ′
is obtained as follows. Suppose the j-th literal of the i-th clause
of δ is selected. Then, also the j-th literal in the i-th clause of δ′
is selected. If the i+1-th input clause of δ is I, then C is used as
input clause in δ′; if the k-th literal is selected in I, then also the
k-th literal is selected in C. Otherwise, the i+1-th input clause of δ
is also used in δ′, for obtaining the i+1-th resolvent of δ′. Clearly,
the latter is of form Ci+1σi+1, for some substitution σi+1, where
Ci+1 is the i+1-th resolvent in δ.
At any step of δ′, it may be impossible to continue its
construction by using the input clause corresponding to the one
used in δ: either the selected literal does not match with the
selected literal in the corresponding input clause in δ, or the latter
is a denial which cannot be used as input for TC . In both cases,
δ′ is discontinued, i.e., δ′ then terminates with failure.
It is easy to see that TC is the required finitely failed tree.
We illustrate the inconsistency tolerance of MSK with an
example inspired by a similar one in [12].




5 : s(chi, bob)
I : ← r(x) ∧ q(x)
U : r(x)← p(y) ∧ s(x, y)
r(x)← p(y) ∧ s(x, y)
2









Fig. 1. Clauses and derivation tree of Example 4.4.
Example 4.4: Let D be a database consisting of clauses 1–5
in Figure 1, defining the predicates r (regular), p (pays taxes),
q (quitted) and s (signed). The integrity constraint I denies the
possibility to have regular status and to have quitted work at the
same time. The update U inserts a clause stating that persons
signed by a tax payer also have regular status.
Clearly, D(I) = false, since r(ada) and q(ada) are true in D.
The case I ′ = ← r(bob)∧ q(bob) of I, however, is satisfied in D
since q(bob) is not true in D.
From the root U , MSK builds the tree as shown in Figure 1
(selected literals are underlined). Since this tree is finitely failed,
it follows that U will not introduce new cases of inconsistency:
all cases of integrity constraints that were satisfied in D remain
satisfied in DU . In particular, I ′ is also satisfied in DU . 
The methodMSK is not complete wrt. inconsistency tolerance,
as shown by the following counter-example.
Example 4.5: Let D∗, U , and IC be as in Example 4.3,
and D∗∗ = D∗ ∪{r(a)}. The only violated basic case in D∗∗ is
← p(a, a), and U does not introduce any additional one. However,
starting from U , MSK derives p(a, y) ← r(y), which it then
refutes by two more steps for resolving the literals in head and
body against ← p(a, a) and r(a). Thus, MSK is not complete
wrt. inconsistency tolerance. Yet, we have the following result. 
Theorem 8 (Weak completeness of MSK ): MSK is weakly
complete wrt. inconsistency tolerance in stratified databases.
Proof: Let D be a stratified database, IC an integrity theory
and U an update for which MSK terminates. We have to show
that DU (IC) = true entails MSK(D, IC, U) = sat. Suppose that
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MSK(D, IC, U) = vio. Thus, by definition of MSK , there is a
refutation rooted at some clause in U with input clauses from
DU plus a denial clause in IC. Hence, integrity is violated in
DU . However, this contradicts the supposition above. SinceMSK
terminates, the result follows.
D. The Method of Gupta, Sagiv, Ullman and Widom
Not all methods are inconsistency-tolerant. An example is the
well-known method in [8], here denoted byMG. The constraints
considered in [8] are of the form
← L ∧R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rn ∧ E1 ∧ · · · ∧ Ek (11)
where L is a literal with a local, i.e., accessible predicate; the
Ri are literals with remote predicates that are not accessible for
integrity checking; the Ej are evaluable literals with arithmetic
expressions. Updates considered in [8] are insertions of facts
into the relation of L. (In fact, the method also works if L is
a conjunction of literals.) For convenience, let l be L’s predicate.
The main result, Theorem 5.2 in [8], refers to a simplification
called reduction. For a constraint I of the form (11) and a fact
f inserted in l, the reduction RED(f, L, I) is essentially the
corresponding simplification in MN . To check if I is satisfied
after inserting f , MG checks if, for facts g in the extension of l,




holds, where  denotes query containment.
Example 4.6: The constraint I = ← l(x, y)∧ r(z)∧x ≤ z ≤ y
requires that no z in r must occur in an interval whose ends
are specified by l. Suppose D = {l(3, 6), l(5, 10)} and U inserts
l(4, 8). Then, DU (I) = true is inferred by MG from
r(z) ∧ 4 ≤ z ≤ 8  (r(z) ∧ 3 ≤ z ≤ 6) ∪ (r(z) ∧ 5 ≤ z ≤ 10),
which essentially expresses that [4, 8] is contained in [3, 10]. 
Example 4.7 shows that MG is not inconsistency-tolerant.
Example 4.7: Consider D = {l(3, 6), l(5, 10), r(7)}, the case
I ′ = ← l(4, 8)∧ r(z)∧4 ≤ z ≤ 8 of I and also U as in Example
4.6. Clearly, D(I) = false, while D(I ′) = true. Assuming the
total integrity premise,MG guarantees, as in 4.6, that U does not
violate integrity, i.e., MG(D, {I}, U) = sat. However, DU (I ′) =
false. Thus MG is not sound wrt. inconsistency tolerance. 
As reported in [8], MG cannot be complete for integrity
checking since constraints may involve inaccessible remote data.
Thus, by Theorem 1, MG is not complete wrt. inconsistency
tolerance either, nor is it weakly complete, by Corollary 3b).
E. The Method of Christiansen and Martinenghi
For an integrity theory IC and an update U , the method in [7],
here dentoted by MCM , consists of the following two steps:
• First, a “pre-simplification” of IC for U , denoted AfterU (IC),
is computed, as described in Def. 4.3 below, such that
D(AfterU (IC)) = DU (IC), for every database D.
• Second, AfterU (IC) is optimized by removing from it all
denials and literals that can be proved to be redundant,
assuming that the total integrity premise, i.e., D(IC) = true,
holds. The result is denoted OptimizeIC(AfterU (IC)).
To run MCM (D, IC, U) is to compute the simplification
OptimizeIC(AfterU (IC)) and evaluate it in D.
Definition 4.3: For an integrity theory IC and an update U ,
let AfterU (IC) be obtained from IC by simultaneously replacing
each atom of the form p(t) by (p(t) ∧ t = b1 ∧ · · · ∧ t = bm)∨
t = a1 ∨· · ·∨t = an, where p(a1), . . . , p(an) are all facts inserted
to p and p(b1), . . . , p(bm) are all facts deleted from p by U .
By using De Morgan’s laws, AfterU (IC) is represented as a set
of denials. Then, OptimizeIC(AfterU (IC)) is obtained, as speci-
fied in Definition 4.4, by a terminating proof procedure, denoted
below by , that is substitutive1, i.e., if F  F ′ then Fσ  F ′σ,
for each pair F , F ′ of sets of formulas and each substitution σ.
Definition 4.4: Let IC, IC′ be sets of denials, I a denial, K
a conjunction of literals, L a literal, and  a terminating proof
procedure. OptimizeIC(IC′) is obtained by exhaustively applying
on IC′ the following rewrite rules, where IC′′ = IC′ \{←K ∧L}.
1) IC′  IC′′ ∪ {←K} if ←K ∧L ∈ IC′ and IC∪ IC′ ←K
2) IC′  IC′ \ {I} if I ∈ IC′ and IC ∪ (IC′ \ {I})  I
In [7] it is shown that MCM is both sound and complete.
Example 4.8: Let I and U be as in Example 3.2. We have
AfterU ({I}) = { ← p(x, y) ∧ p(x, z) ∧ y = z,
← x = i ∧ y = t ∧ p(x, z) ∧ y = z,
← p(x, y) ∧ x = i ∧ z = t ∧ y = z,
← x = i ∧ y = t ∧ x = i ∧ z = t ∧ y = z}
Then, Optimize removes the first constraint (subsumed by I), the
second (subsumed by the third), and the fourth (a tautology). The
simplification returned byMCM (to be evaluated in the old state)
is the third constraint, equivalent to I ′ as found in Example 3.2.
Then, for each database D, DU (I) = true iff D(I ′) = true. 
The MCM method is not sound wrt. inconsistency tolerance
due to the behavior of Optimize, as illustrated in Example 4.9.
Example 4.9: Let IC = {← p∧q,← p∧∼q,← p∧r(x)∧s(x)}
and U = {insert r(a)}. The simplification IC′ of IC for U com-
puted by MCM is ∅ (i.e., U cannot violate integrity if D(IC) =
true), since ← p, derived from IC by , subsumes all denials in
AfterU (IC) = {← p∧q,← p∧∼q,← p∧r(x)∧s(x),← p∧s(a)}.
Now, let D = {p, s(a)}. Clearly, I =← p∧r(a)∧s(a) is a case
of the last constraint in IC. We have: D(IC) = false, D(I) = true
and D(IC′) = true. However, DU (I) = false, which shows that
MCM is not sound wrt. inconsistency tolerance. 
One may object that IC above is equivalent to ← p and thus
redundant. For IC = {← p}, misleading optimizations would be
avoided. In general, however, redundancy is undecidable.
Optimize never harms inconsistency tolerance if IC contains a
single constraint, as shown by Theorem 9 below. (More generally,
it can be shown that MCM is sound wrt. inconsistency tolerance
if each pair of constraints has no predicate in common.)
Theorem 9 (Inconsistency tolerance of MCM ): For singleton
integrity theories, MCM is sound wrt. inconsistency tolerance in
hierarchical databases.
Proof: Let D be a hierarchical database, I a denial, U an
update, I ′ the simplification of {I} for U obtained byMCM and
θ a substitution such that Iθ ∈ S(D, I). Since M(D, {I}, U) =
D(I ′), we have to show:
If D(I ′) = true then DU (Iθ) = true. (12)
We prove (12) by transitivity of (13) and (14), below, as follows.
If D(I ′) = true then D(I ′θ) = true. (13)
If D(I ′θ) = true then DU (Iθ) = true. (14)
1Substitutivity of  is assumed implicitly in [7].
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Evidently, (13) holds. Note now that, by Definition 4.3, After is
substitutive, i.e., AfterU (Iθ) = AfterU (I)θ. Since  is also sub-
stitutive, I ′θ is obtained from AfterU (Iθ) by the same sequence
of Optimize steps as I ′ is obtained from AfterU (I). Then, (14)
holds because, as shown in [7] to prove soundness of MCM ,
the evaluation of the result of After in the old state is a sound
integrity checking method, and the application of any of the steps
in Optimize preserves soundness.
The interplay between multiple constraints also causes MCM
to be not complete (not even weakly) wrt. inconsistency tolerance.
This is shown by the following counter-example.
Example 4.10: For D = {q(b)}, IC = {← p(a)∧q(x), ← q(b)}
and U = {insert p(a), delete q(b)}, we obtain AfterU (IC) =
{← q(x) ∧ a=a ∧ x=b, ← p(a) ∧ q(x) ∧ x=b, ← q(b) ∧ b =b}.
From that, OptimizeIC(AfterU (IC)) = {← q(x)} is obtained
as follows. First, the third denial in AfterU (IC) is dropped,
since it is subsumed by the second denial in IC. Then, a = a is
dropped in the first denial. That then subsumes the second denial,
which is thus removed. Last, x = b is dropped from the remain-
ing denial ← q(x)∧ x = b, since ← q(x) can be proved from
← q(x)∧ x = b and ← q(b) in IC. Thus, since DU (IC) = true
and MCM (D, IC, U) = D(OptimizeIC(AfterU (IC))) = false,
neither (4) nor (6) holds for MCM . 
V. APPLICATIONS
Inconsistency-tolerant integrity checking can improve solutions
to several problems of database management. We show that for
update requests in V-A, for repairs in V-B, for schema evolution in
V-C, for reliable risk management in V-D, and for unsatisfiability
handling in V-E.
Updates are a cornerstone of each database management ap-
plication addressed in this section. Each update U is required to
preserve the satisfaction of a given integrity theory IC. Tradition-
ally, integrity preservation has meant that U maps a state D such
that D(IC) = true to a state DU such that DU (IC) = true. But
as soon as constraint violations in D become tolerable, the notion
of integrity preservation must be generalized as follows.
Definition 5.1: For a database D and an integrity theory IC,
an update U is said to preserve integrity if S(D, IC)⊆S(DU , IC).
Note that definition 5.1 does not require total integrity of D,
i.e., U may preserve integrity even if executed in the presence
of violated constraints. The following corollary of Definitions 3.2
and 5.1 states that updates can be checked for preserving integrity
by any method that is sound wrt. inconsistency tolerance.
Corollary 10: For a database D, an integrity theory IC and an
inconsistency-tolerant integrity checking methodM, an update U
preserves integrity if M(D, IC, U) = sat.
In general, the only-if half of Corollary 10 does not hold, as
shown in Example 5.1. It is easily seen that it does hold for
methods that are complete wrt. inconsistency tolerance.
Example 5.1: Let p be defined by p(x, y)← s(x, y, z) and
p(x, y)← q(x)∧ r(x, y) in a database D in which q(a) and r(a, a)
are the only facts that contribute to the natural join of q and r.
Further, let IC = {← p(x, x)} and U = {insert s(a, a, b)}. Clearly,
U preserves integrity, since the case C =← p(a, a) is already vio-
lated in D. However, the inconsistency-tolerant methods MLST
and MSK and others generate and evaluate the simplification
← p(a, a) of ← p(x, x) and thus output vio. 
A. Inconsistency-tolerant Satisfaction of Update Requests
We define an update request as a closed first-order formula
intended to be made true by some integrity-preserving update. For
a database D, an update U is said to satisfy an update request R if
DU (R) = true and U preserves integrity. ‘View update’ requests
are a common variant of update requests. An update method is a
method to compute updates for satisfying update requests.
Similar to integrity checking, also all known update methods
have traditionally postulated the total satisfaction of all constraints
in the old state. However, that requirement is as unrealistic for
satisfying update requests as for integrity checking. And, in fact,
we are going to see that it can be abandoned just as well, for the
class of methods defined as follows.
Definition 5.2: An update method UM is inconsistency-
tolerant if each update computed by UM preserves integrity.
For an update request R and a database D, many update
methods work in two phases. First, an update U such that
DU (R) = true is computed. Then, U is checked for integrity
preservation by some integrity checking method. If that check is
positive, U is accepted. Else, U is rejected and another update
candidate, if any, is computed and checked. Hence, the following
corollary follows from Definition 5.2 and Corollary 10.
Corollary 11: Each update method that uses an inconsistency-
tolerant method to check its computed updates for preserving
integrity is inconsistency-tolerant.
Corollary 11 serves to identify several known update methods
as inconsistency-tolerant, since they use inconsistency-tolerant
integrity checking methods. Among them are, e.g., the update
methods in [13], [14] which use the integrity checking method of
[5], shown to be inconsistency-tolerant in IV-B.
Another well-known update method, by Kakas & Mancarella,
is described in [15]. For convenience, let us name it KM. It
does not use any integrity checking method as a separate module,
hence Corollary 11 is not applicable. However, the inconsistency
tolerance of KM can be tracked down as outlined below.
For satisfying an update request, KM explores a possibly
nested search space of ‘abductive’ derivations and ‘consistency’
derivations. Roughly, abductive derivations compute hypothetical
updates of facts for satisfying a given update request; consistency
derivations check these updates for integrity. Each update gener-
ated by KM consists of a bipartite set of positive and negative
ground literals, corresponding to insertions and, resp., deletions
of ground facts. For more details, we refer the reader to [15].
It suffices here to mention that, for KM, all constraints are
represented by denials that are used as candidate input clauses
in consistency derivations. Each consistency derivation of each
update computed by KM corresponds to a finitely failed attempt
to refute the update as inconsistent.
It is easy to verify that, for an update request R, each update
U computed by KM makes R become true in DU , even if some
constraint is violated in D. What is at stake is the preservation
of the satisfaction of each case that is satisfied in D, while cases
that are violated in D may remain violated in DU . The following
theorem entails that satisfied cases are preserved by KM.
Theorem 12: The method KM is inconsistency-tolerant.
Proof: By Definition 5.2, we have to show that each update
computed by KM preserves integrity. Suppose that, for some
update request in some database D and some integrity theory
IC, KM would compute and accept an update U that does not
preserve integrity. Then, by Definition 5.1, there is a constraint I
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in IC such that D(I) = true and DU (I) = false. Hence, by the
definition of KM, there is a consistency derivation δ rooted at
one of the literals in U , that uses I as input clause and terminates
by deducing the empty clause. That, however, signals that the
root of δ causes a violation of I. Thus, KM rejects U , which
contradicts the supposition that KM accepts U .
Example 5.2 illustrates the usefulness of inconsistency-tolerant
update methods.
Example 5.2: Let D = {q(x)← r(x) ∧ s(x), p(a, a)}, IC =
{← p(x, x), ← p(a, y)∧ q(y)} and R the update request to make
q(a) true. To satisfy R, most update methods compute the can-
didate update U = {insert r(a), insert s(a)}. To check if U pre-
serves integrity, most integrity checking methods compute the
simplification ← p(a, a) of the second constraint in IC. Rather
than accessing the p relation for evaluating ← p(a, a), integrity
checking methods that are not inconsistency-tolerant may use the
invalid total integrity premise that D(IC) = true, by reasoning as
follows. The first constraint ← p(x, x) in IC is not affected by U
and subsumes ← p(a, a), hence both constraints remain satisfied
in DU . Thus, such methods conclude that U preserves integrity.
However, that is wrong, since the case← p(a, y)∧ q(y) is satisfied
in D but violated in DU . By contrast, each inconsistency-
tolerant update method rejects U and computes the update
U ′ = U ∪{delete p(a, a)} for satisfying R. Clearly, U ′ preserves
integrity. Incidentally, U ′ even removes a violated case. 
B. Partial Repairs
Roughly, ‘repairing’ is to compute updates to databases with vi-
olated constraints such that the updated databases satisfy integrity.
Based on cases, Definition 5.3 introduces ‘partial repairs’. They
repair only a fragment of the database.
Definition 5.3: Let D be a database, IC an integrity theory
and S a set of cases of constraints in IC such that D(S) = false.
An update U is called a repair of S in D if DU (S) = true; if
DU (IC) = false, U is also called a partial repair of IC in D, else
U is called a total repair of IC in D.
Related notions in the literature [1], [16], [17] only deal with
total repairs, additionally requiring them to be minimal, in some
sense. In [18], null values and a 3-valued semantics are used to
“summarize” total repairs.
Repairing can be costly, if not intractable [19]. Thus, at first
sight, a good heuristic to curtail inconsistency could be to use
partial instead of total repairs, particularly in large databases with
potentially unknown inconsistencies. However, partial repairs may
not preserve integrity, as shown by the following example.
Example 5.3: Let IC = {← p(x, y, z)∧∼q(x, z), ←q(x, x)}
and D = {p(a, b, c), p(b, b, c), p(c, b, c), q(a, c), q(c, c)}. The vio-
lated basic cases are← p(b, b, c)∧∼q(b, c) and← q(c, c). Repair-
ing {← q(x, x)} by {delete q(c, c)} does not preserve integrity,
since ← p(c, b, c)∧∼q(c, c) is satisfied in D but not in DU .
However, the partial repairs {delete p(b, b, c)} and {insert q(b, c)}
of IC do preserve integrity. The only subset-minimal total
repairs are {delete q(c, c), delete p(b, b, c), delete p(c, b, c)} and
{delete q(c, c), insert q(b, c), delete p(c, b, c)}. 
The dilemma that total repairs may require more update op-
erations than partial repairs, while the latter may not preserve
integrity, is relaxed by the following corollary of Corollary 10.
It says that it suffices to check partial repairs for integrity
preservation by an inconsistency-tolerant method.
Corollary 13: For each inconsistency-tolerant method M,
each database D and each integrity theory IC, each partial repair
U of IC such that M(D, IC, U) = sat preserves integrity.
The following example illustrates how integrity-preserving re-
pairs can be computed by inconsistency-tolerant update methods.
Example 5.4: Let D be a database and S = {←B1, . . . ,←Bn}
(n ≥ 0) a set of cases of constraints in an integrity theory
IC. Thus, D(S) = false if and only if D(← Bi) = true for
some i. Hence, an integrity-preserving repair of S that tol-
erates extant violations of cases not in S can be computed
by each inconsistency-tolerant update method, by issuing the
update request ∼vioS , where vioS is defined by the n clauses
vioS←B1, . . . , vioS←Bn. Update methods that are not incon-
sistency-tolerant cannot be used, since they may accept repairs
that do not preserve integrity, as seen in Example 5.2. 
C. Inconsistency-tolerant Schema Evolution
A database schema evolves via schema updates, i.e., removals,
additions or alterations of integrity constraints or of database
clauses with non-empty bodies. Since changes of the set of clauses
can be captured by update requests as in V-A, and deletions of
constraints never cause any violation, we focus below on schema
updates consisting of insertions of constraints.
Whenever a new constraint I is added to the integrity theory,
it may be too costly to evaluate it on the spot, let alone to
immediately repair all violated cases of I. As long as such repairs
are delayed, traditional integrity checking is not applicable, since
the total integrity premise does not hold. However, inconsistency-
tolerant integrity checking can be used, no matter for how long
the repair of violated cases is delayed.
More precisely, let IC∗ = IC∪{I} be an integrity theory ob-
tained by the schema update insert I. Then, each inconsistency-
tolerant methodM for computingM(D, IC∗, U) for each update
U issued after IC has been updated can guarantee that all cases in
IC∗ that are satisfied in D remain satisfied in DU . If M was not
inconsistency-tolerant, then a possible inconsistency of D ∪ IC∗
would invalidate any output of M(D, IC∗, U), even if integrity
was totally satisfied before IC was updated.
Theorem 14 below captures another advantage of incon-
sistency-tolerant integrity checking for schema evolution.
Theorem 14: For each database D, each pair of integrity
theories IC, IC′, each update U and each inconsistency-tolerant
method M, the following holds, where IC∗ = IC∪ IC′.
If D(IC)=true and M(D, IC∗, U)=sat then DU (IC)=true (15)
Proof: Since IC ⊆ S(D, IC∗), (15) follows from (3).
Theorem 14 says that M guarantees the preservation of to-
tal integrity of IC even if D(IC′) = false. That is useful for
distinguishing hard constraints (those in IC), the satisfaction of
which is indispensable, and soft constraints (in IC′), the violation
of which is tolerable. Thus, by Theorem 14, each inconsistency-
tolerant method guarantees that all hard constraints remain totally
satisfied across updates even if there are violated soft constraints.
Example 5.5: Let hr and lr be two predicates that model
a high, resp., low risk in some application domain. Further,
I1 =←hr(x), I2 =← lr(x), be a hard, resp., soft constraint
for protecting against high and, resp., low risks. Then, each
inconsistency-tolerant method M can be used to preserve the
satisfaction of I1 across updates, even if I2 is violated. 
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D. Inconsistency-tolerant Risk Management
Since constraint violations may be hidden or unknown, and
since all integrity checking methods traditionally have insisted
on total integrity, their use has not been reliable. But now, the
definition of inconsistency-tolerant integrity checking provides
a decision criterion for distinguishing reliable from unreliable
methods. The unreliability of methods that are not inconsistency-
tolerant is illustrated in the following elaboration of example 5.5.
Example 5.6: Let D = {p(0, 0), p(1, 2), p(2, 3), p(3, 4), ...}.
Further, let the predicates in IC = {← lr(x), ← hr(x)} be
defined by the clauses
lr(x) ← p(x, x)
hr(x) ← p(0, x), q(x, y), y > th
where lr and hr indicate a low and, resp., a high risk. In the clause
defining hr, the term th may stand for a threshold value.
The purpose of IC is to protect the application from any risk.
Yet, in D, the low-risk presence of p(0, 0) is tolerated. Now, let U
= insert q(0, 100000). Then, methods that are not inconsistency-
tolerant, such as MG, MCM , reason as follows for checking if
U preserves integrity. Using U for simplifying ← hr(x) yields
the case ← p(0, 0), 100000 > th. It is obtained from the body of
the definition of hr by binding the variables x and y to 0 and,
resp., 100000, and then dropping the literal q(0, 100000). Clearly,
that case is subsumed by ← p(x, x), which defines lr and is not
affected by U . The total integrity premise entails that ← p(x, x)
is satisfied in D. Hence, methods that are not inconsistency-
tolerant may deduce that ← p(x, x) remains satisfied in DU .
From that, such methods deduce that also the subsumed constraint
← p(0, 0), 100000 > th, and hence ← hr(x) is satisfied in DU .
Thus, even if 100000 > th, methods such as those mentioned
above accept U , i.e., they fail to detect that U causes a high
risk. Thus, their output is not reliable in the presence of extant
low risks. As opposed to that, if 100000 > th, then U is reliably
rejected by each inconsistency-tolerant method, since the case
← hr(0) is satisfied in D but violated in DU . 
E. Unsatisfiability-tolerant Integrity Checking
By bad design or faulty schema updates, database evolution
may lead to an unsatisfiable integrity theory, i.e., no state could
ever satisfy integrity. Theoretically, unsatisfiable integrity is the
worst possible situation, since each state then is irreparable. Since
unsatisfiability is known to be undecidable in general, it even
might never be detected. Anyway, with an unsatisfiable integrity
theory, schema evolution may seem to have reached a dead end.
However, inconsistency-tolerant integrity checking can be ap-
plied even if the constraints are unsatisfiable, i.e., if integrity
is inevitably violated in any state. By using an inconsistency-
tolerant method, one can guarantee that all satisfied cases of
constraints remain satisfied, even though integrity as a whole is
never attainable. Thus, each inconsistency-tolerant method is also
unsatisfiability-tolerant, as defined below.
Definition 5.4: An integrity checking method M is called
unsatisfiability-tolerant if, for each database D, each unsatisfiable
integrity theory IC and each update U , (3) holds.
Definition 5.4 straightforwardly entails Corollary 15, since
unsatisfiability of IC is in fact not excluded in Definition 3.2.
Corollary 15: Each inconsistency-tolerant integrity checking
method is unsatisfiability-tolerant.
Example 5.7: Let IC be the unsatisfiable integrity theory
{← p(x, x), ← ∼p(0, 0), ← q(x)∧ r(x)}. Clearly, the first
two denials in IC can never be satisfied at a time. However, in D =
{p(0, 0), q(0), r(0), q(1), r(2), q(3), r(4), q(5), . . . , q(99), r(100)},
all basic cases of IC except ← p(0, 0) and ← q(0) ∧ r(0) are
satisfied. Although IC can never be fully satisfied, it makes sense
to accept updates such as deleting q(0), which would actually
remove a case of violated integrity, and to prevent insertions,
e.g., of q(2), that would introduce new violations. Also, no
inconsistency-tolerant method would ever reject any request to
delete any fact from q or r. Or when, e.g., the insertion of a fact
of the form q(a) is requested, only the simplification ← r(a) will
be checked, i.e., the request is rejected only if r(a) is in DU . 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We now describe the experiments performed for evaluating,
first, the benefits of ITIC for database updating, second, its
benefits for query answering, and, third, the impact of ITIC
on the performance of updating, checking, and querying. Each
experiment is based on a series of updates, starting from an
initial state and leading to a final state. Updates are either
checked by ITIC, as proposed in this paper, or not checked at all,
since checking updates in inconsistent databases is traditionally
considered invalid. More precisely, we run the following three
kinds of experiments, the setups of which are described in VI-A.
• Updates may change the amount of inconsistency. In VI-B,
we assess how inconsistency varies between initial and final
states, both when ITIC is used and when integrity is not
checked. We do that by measuring the percentage of tuples
that participate in constraint violations.
• Extant inconsistency may cause incorrect answers. In VI-C,
we measure and compare the amounts of incorrect tuples in
the answers to queries posed in the final states, both when
ITIC is used and when integrity is not checked. That way, we
obtain an indication of the quality of query answers depend-
ing on whether ITIC is used or not. We compute answers
both by traditional query evaluation and by consistent query
answering (CQA), a technique for improving the quality of
query answers in the presence of inconsistency [1].
• Using ITIC obviously weighs in more on performance than
running no integrity checks at all. In VI-D, we measure and
report on the times required for integrity checking, updating
and querying both when ITIC is used and when integrity is
not checked.
A. Parameters and setups
The tests are run on the databases and queries of the TPC-H
decision support benchmark2, which is known to have a broad
industry-wide relevance. In order to cover a significant spectrum
of update series, we have experimented with the following vari-
ants of parameter values for the initial state and the updates.
• s: initial state size. We experiment with s = 100MB, 500MB,
1GB, 2GB. A database with s = 2GB has approximately 16
million tuples.
• p: initial inconsistency, expressed as the percentage of tuples
that participate in constraint violations in the initial state.
For simplicity, we only consider primary key constraint
violations. We experiment with p = 0%, 1%, 10%, 33%. For
example, p = 10% and s = 2GB means that 1,600,000 tuples
2http://www.tpc.org/tpch/
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violate a primary key constraint. Violations occur when the
same key value is repeated; we experiment with violations
caused by 2 to 50 repetitions, and an equal percentage of
violations in all tables.
• i: percentage of insertions in the update series that violate a
primary key constraint. We experiment with i = 10%, 50%,
90%. We generate update series consisting of insertions and
deletions of a size equal to 10% and, respectively, 1% of the
size of the initial database, so as to simulate a significant
evolution of the database. For example, with i = 10%, and
s = 2GB, there will be 160,000 insertions violating primary
key constraints, i.e., 10% of 10% of 16 million tuples. (Note
that deletions cannot cause any violation of primary key
constraints.)
The TPC-H suite provides a script, called dbgen, for generat-
ing database states of a given size that satisfy the constraints. In
order to set the initial inconsistency, we use the same technique
as in [20], where the authors test their CQA approach against the
TPC-H benchmark. To have, e.g., p = 10% and violations with 2
key repetitions each in a database of s = 1GB, dbgen is first used
to create a consistent state of size 0.95GB; we denote that state
by D̄ps . Then, a set A of tuples of size 0.05GB from the database
is randomly selected from a uniform distribution; a new set B of
size 0.05GB is generated from this, with the same key values as
in A, and non-key values taken randomly from the other tuples in
the database. Then, set B is added to D̄ps , and the resulting state
Dps has the desired size s and inconsistency p. Similarly, we use
dbgen to generate a set of updates U is consisting of deletions
(of size 1% of s) and insertions (10% of s), i percent of which
introduce new constraint violations.
B. Measuring inconsistency variations through updates
The first measurement we have performed assesses the incon-
sistency, i.e., the percentage of tuples that violate a constraint,
in the final state reached after a series of updates. We denote
as DNC (resp., DITIC) the state reached after executing on D
p
s
the updates in U is with no checking (resp., if accepted by an
ITIC method). Both here and in the other tests, we use MN as
the integrity checking method, since it is sound, complete and
inconsistency-tolerant. Figure 2 shows how inconsistency varies
between the initial state Dps and the final states DNC and DITIC for
s = 100MB and for all possible values for p (lines with squares
for p = 0%, circles for p = 1%, lozenges for p = 10%, and
triangles for p = 33%) and i (light grey for i = 10%, dark grey
for i = 50%, and black for i = 90%). The dashed lines refer
to the no-checking scenario, where inconsistency always grows,
unless i < p (which is the case in our tests only for p = 33% and
i = 10%). The continuous lines refer to the ITIC scenario, where
the number of violations cannot increase; in fact, inconsistency
naturally decreases, since the database tends to become bigger
after executing our series of updates, while inconsistency does not
increase. The differences in the amount of inconsistency between
DNC and DITIC are quite significant in many cases. For example,
for p = 1% and i = 10%, inconsistency amounts to 1.81% of the
database in DNC, while it is only 0.99% in DITIC (differences are
even bigger for bigger values of i). Needless to say, if the initial
state is consistent (p = 0), integrity is totally preserved with ITIC,
while it is lost with no checking. Similar considerations hold also
for the other values considered for s.
Another quantitative difference, not shown in Figure 2, between
DNC and DITIC regards their sizes. Obviously, DITIC does not
contain any new violation and is therefore always smaller than
DNC whenever i > 0 (their difference increases as i increases).
For example, for p = 10% and i = 90%, the size varies from


























































































Fig. 2. Inconsistency measured after updates applied to an initial state
with size s = 100MB and different values for p (initial inconsistency) and
i (percentage of insertions in the update series violating a constraint), as
indicated. Continuous lines indicate tests run with ITIC (where inconsistency
never increases), while dashed lines indicate no checking (NC).
C. Measuring incorrect tuples in query answers
Our second experiment tests the negative effect of inconsistency
on query answering, and to which extent such effect can be cured
by handling database maintenance with ITIC.
Inconsistency may be responsible for incorrect answers to
queries. Let us indicate with QD the set of tuples in the answer
to query Q evaluated in database D. We define a tuple t to
be a correct answer to Q in D if t ∈ QD̄ , where D̄ is the
reference database of D, i.e., the state in which D would be if no
inconsistency had occurred at any time. Accordingly, we define
the false positives of Q in D as the set Q+D = QD \QD̄ , the false
negatives as Q–D = QD̄ \QD . The smaller Q+D and Q–D , the better
the quality of QD . Determining the reference database for a given
D requires, in general, information on all the updates that have
led to D, which is typically unavailable. However, since in our
experiments we have that kind of information, for our purposes
it is sufficient to assume that D̄ps is the reference database of D
p
s .
Another way to remove inconsistency from Dps is to eliminate
all tuples that participate in constraint violations. This is a very
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strict repair procedure, since some of the eliminated tuples may
indeed be correct. However, it is more feasible than determining
the reference database, in general. We denote by D̃ps the state
obtained in this way. Because of its consistency, traditional
integrity checking can be applied to any series of updates starting
from D̃ps . We denote by Dclean the state obtained from D̃
p
s by
executing the updates in U is accepted by MN .
Our tests measure and compare, for given benchmark queries,
the amounts of false positives and negatives in DNC, DITIC, and
Dclean. To this end, consider that the database Dideal obtained
by executing on D̄ps the updates in U is accepted by MN is the
reference database of each of DNC, DITIC, and Dclean.
Queries that always return a fixed, very small number of
results coming from complex aggregations are not well-suited
for our purposes, since even tiny variations in the state may
imply different aggregate values, and thus false positives and
negatives. Therefore we choose to focus on queries that return
at least 10 results, namely queries Q3 and Q10 of the benchmark.
Such queries are “top-k” queries that output the first few results
of an aggregation operation.3 Q3 involves 3 relations, selects 4
attributes, and returns 10 results. Q10 involves 4 relations, selects
8 attributes, and returns 20 results.
In order to compare false positives and negatives of large query
answers, we also consider queries Qall3 and Q
all
10 , that we define
as identical to Q3 and, resp., Q10, but without being limited to
the top 10 or, resp., 20 results.
Finally, we also consider the rewritings Qcqa3 and Q
cqa
10 of
Q3 and, resp., Q10 obtained by the CQA rewriting technique
described in [20]. Intuitively, CQA consists in rewriting a given
query Q over a database D with an integrity theory IC into a new,
more complex query Qcqa, the evaluation of which only produces
the consistent answers to Q. In the definition of [1], [20], a tuple
is a consistent answer to Q in D if it is an answer to Q in each
consistent database whose set difference wrt. D is minimal. CQA
can therefore be regarded as a technique for reducing the amount
of incorrect answer tuples.





10 } and every D ∈ {DNC, DITIC, Dclean}. Note that
|Q+D| = |Q–D| for Q ∈ {Q3, Q10}, since the cardinality of the
query answers is fixed by the “top-k” clause.
Figures 3 and 4 compare the amounts of false positives for Q3
and, resp., Q10 in DNC, DITIC, and Dclean, with s = 100MB and
all combinations of p and i. The benefits of ITIC are significant,
especially for lower amounts of initial inconsistency. For example,
for p = 1% and i = 10%, there are only 4 incorrect answers
among the top 10 answers to Q3 in DITIC, whereas all top 10
answers are incorrect in DNC. The graph also signals that initial
repairing is beneficial: removing all potentially incorrect data
lowers false positives and negatives considerably. Recall, however,
that repairing is costly.
Moreover, although the answers in Dclean are usually better than
those in DITIC, it is not necessarily so, as shown, e.g., for Q10
with i = 10% and p = 1%, where the number of false positives is
7 in Dclean, but 4 in DITIC. The other lines in the figure report the
amounts of false positives for Qcqa3 and Q
cqa
10 in DNC and DITIC
(not in Dclean, since it is consistent, so the answers to Q
cqa
3 and
Qcqa10 coincide with those to Q3 and, resp., Q10). Although slower
3The queries in the TPC-H specification are parameterized, and the standard
suggests values for these parameters. In the experiments, we used the
suggested values in all the queries.
in execution, such queries further improve the quality of answers,
and in some cases they even eliminate all false positives in DITIC.
This suggests that, for quality-critical OLTP applications, where
some extra time is affordable for CQA but not for total repairs,
ITIC should be used for database maintenance together with CQA
for query answering. When the database is too inconsistent, as,
e.g., for p = 33%, an update phase of 10% the size of the database
cannot do much to significantly improve consistency, so all top





























Fig. 3. The lines refer to an initial state size s = 100MB and different
values for p (initial inconsistency) and i, and show the false positives for Q3
on DNC (stars), Q3 on DITIC (crosses), Q3 on Dclean (triangles), Q
cqa
3 on
DNC (squares), and Q
cqa




























Fig. 4. The lines refer to an initial state size s = 100MB and different values
for p (initial inconsistency) and i, and show the false positives for Q10 on
DNC (stars), Q10 on DITIC (crosses), Q10 on Dclean (triangles), Q
cqa
10 on
DNC (squares), and Q
cqa
10 on DITIC (circles).
Figure 5 shows the amounts of both false positives and neg-
atives for Qall3 and Q
all
10 , for s = 100MB, p = 1%, and for all
values of i. Note that these values are higher than in Figures 3
and 4, since Qall3 and Q
all
10 do not restrict to the top 10, resp., 20
results. Again, the benefits of ITIC seem impressive.
Finally, Figure 6 shows the amount of false positives for Qall3
and Qall10 with i = 50% and p = 1% for different values of s,
both in DNC and in DITIC. We observe that the amount of false
positives in DNC is about 6 times higher than in DITIC, therefore
with remarkable benefits due to ITIC. The mentioned factor
depends of course on the chosen parameters and on the selection
predicates in the queries, and can be explained as follows. Queries
Qall3 and Q
all
10 turn out to retrieve a number of false positives that
is proportional to the number of tuples violating the constraints,
which, in turn, is proportional to s, since p is fixed. Since the
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Fig. 5. False positives and negatives for Qall3 and Q
all
10 in DNC (squares)
and DITIC (diamonds) with initial state size s = 100MB, initial inconsistency



























Fig. 6. False positives for Qall3 in DNC (squares) and DITIC (diamonds),
and Qall10 in DNC (crosses) and DITIC (triangles) for p = 1% and i = 50%
for different sizes of the initial state.
size of the insertions is 10% ·s, the inconsistency in DNC is about
(i · 10% + p)/p = 6 times higher than that in DITIC.
D. Measuring execution times
In our last test, we measure the time consumed for integrity
checking, updating, and querying in the states obtained by all
update series considered so far, i.e., leading 1) from Dps to DNC, 2)
from Dps to DITIC, 3) from D̃
p
s to Dclean, 4) from D̄
p
s to Dideal. The
test machine sports a 2.66GHz Quad Core Intel processor with
4GB 800MHz RAM and runs Sqlserver 2005 under Windows XP.
Apart from 1), where no time is spent for integrity checking,
there are little notable differences of measured times across
different update series. For example, for s = 1GB and p = 1%,
integrity checking, if performed, always takes around 450 seconds
in total, updating about 18 seconds, answering non-CQA queries
2.2 seconds, and answering CQA queries 12 seconds. For larger
amounts of inconsistency, e.g., p = 33%, improvements up to 10%
of the execution times wrt. the update series 2) are observed both
for query answering and for integrity checking in 4) and up to
20% in 3). These, however, are due to the different sizes of initial
states, which are the smaller the higher the initial inconsistency:
while Dps has size s, D̃
p
s has size (1 − p) · s and D̄ps has size
(1− p/2) · s.
Note that we did not perform any particular tuning of the
database, so as to speed up query answering or integrity checking.
E. Summary of experimental results
The experiments reported in this section have provided evi-
dence of the following benefits of ITIC:
• A series of updates executed on a database state leads to
lower amounts of inconsistency if filtered by ITIC, with
no extra checking cost incurred with respect to integrity
checking in a traditional, consistent setting.
• The query answers obtained from a database state reached
after a series of updates checked by ITIC are generally
better than without checking, in that they contain fewer false
positives and negatives.
• Traditional query answering can be replaced by CQA to
further improve the quality of query answers.
The smaller the initial amount of inconsistency and the larger
the amount of inconsistency introduced by updates, the more the
above effects become visible. Or, in other words, larger initial
amounts of constraint violations require longer periods of updates
checked by inconsistency-tolerant methods for decreasing the
initial inconsistency significantly.
VII. RELATED WORK
Various forms of exception handling for dealing with persis-
tent inconsistencies as embodied by constraint violations have
been proposed in [21], [22], [23] and others. However, integrity
checking is not addressed in any of those works.
Another approach to deal with inconsistencies is to repair them
(cf. V-B), which, despite recent advances [18], [17], is known
to be intractable in general. Anyway, all approaches that either
eliminate or work around inconsistencies (e.g., by repairing them
or treating them as exceptions) need to know about extant integrity
violations. As opposed to that, ITIC simply leaves inconsistencies
alone. That works reliably, even if violated cases of constraints
are unknown to the user or the application, as seen in V-D.
To the best of our knowledge, the putatively fundamental
role alleged to total integrity as an indispensable premise for
simplified integrity checking has never been challenged. That may
be due to the classical ex contradictione quodlibet rule, by which
conclusions derived from inconsistency cannot be considered
reliable. However, in V-D, we have seen that, on the contrary,
the use of inconsistency-tolerant methods is fully reliable.
On the other hand, it is astonishing that total integrity has
always been insisted on, since many database contexts in practice
suffer from some amount of inconsistency.
Nevertheless, interesting work has been going on in recent
years under the banner of “inconsistency tolerance”. A lot of
it is concerned with consistent query answering in inconsistent
databases (abbr. CQA) [1], [16], [19]. CQA defines answers to
be correct if they are logical consequences of each reasonably
repaired state of the database, i.e., each state that satisfies integrity
and differs from the given violated state in some minimal way.
CQA and ITIC have in common that they neither capitulate in
the presence of inconsistency (as classical logic would), nor need
to appeal to repairing violated constraints (as traditional query
answering and integrity checking would). However their main
purposes are different, since CQA enables query answering, while
ITIC enables updating, even when the database violates integrity.
Yet, integrity checking (which can be seen as a special-purpose
variant of query answering) has, to the best of our knowledge,
never been addressed in detail by the CQA community. As
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was observed in Section VI, ITIC can be considered as largely
complementary to CQA, since the former prevents new integrity
violations to occur during updates but does not remove the effect
that extant violations may have on query answers, which is
precisely what the latter does.
Also, a variety of paraconsistent logic approaches that are
tolerant and robust wrt. inconsistency have received some atten-
tion, e.g., [24], [25]. Most of them, however, deviate significantly
from the syntax and semantics of classical first-order logic, while
ITIC does not. Some paraconsistent approaches resort to modal
or multivalued logic. As opposed to that, ours complies with
conventional two-valued semantics of databases and integrity in
the literature.
Yet, resolution-based query answering (by which each of the
methods mentioned in this paper has been implemented) can be
characterized as a procedural form of paraconsistent reasoning
[26]. This is particularly noteworthy for proof procedures that
use integrity constraints as candidate input clauses, such as those
in [12], [4]. Thus, the paraconsistency of logic programming nat-
urally qualifies it as a paradigm for implementing inconsistency-
tolerant approaches to database integrity.
Further relevant work on the management of inconsistencies in
databases comes from the field of inconsistency measuring [27].
Inconsistency measures are useful for updates and integrity
checking if one wants to accept an update only if the measure
of inconsistency of the old state does not increase in the new
state. That, however, is precisely accomplished by ITIC, as soon
as the set of violated cases of an integrity theory is measured:
that set cannot be increased by an update if the update is checked
by an inconsistency-tolerant method. Also other measures, such
as those proposed in [27], should be useful for determining the
increase or decrease of inconsistency across updates. Alternative
ways to characterize ITIC, including definitions based on inconsis-
tency measures, are described in [10]. There, different classes of
integrity checking strategies are identified, studied and compared
wrt. their inconsistency tolerance capabilities.
This paper improves and extends [28] in several ways. New
are the properties and conditions for completeness and weak
completeness wrt. inconsistency tolerance. Also the application
of ITIC to various database management problems in section V
is new. Another important addition of this paper is the validation
of the practical relevance of ITIC in section VI.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The purpose of integrity checking is to ensure that the satis-
faction of each constraint is preserved across updates. Tradi-
tionally, the theory of efficient integrity checking stipulates total
integrity, i.e., that all constraints be satisfied in each state, without
exception. In practice, however, that is an almost utopian wish.
To overcome this gap between theory and practice, we have
relaxed the total integrity premise by a new requirement that
tolerates inconsistency. Essentially, it asks that only those cases
of constraints that are satisfied in the old state remain satisfied
in the new state, while any amount of extant violated cases can
be tolerated. (Cases are obtained from constraints by instantiating
∀-quantified variables that are not governed by ∃-quantified ones.)
We have seen that many (though not all) existing integrity
checking methods comply with this relaxation without penalty,
i.e., no change or adaptation of methods that can be shown to
be inconsistency-tolerant is necessary at all. For such methods,
traditional integrity checking becomes merely a special border
case of our inconsistency-tolerant generalization.
The main benefits of inconsistency-tolerant integrity checking
(ITIC) as identified in this paper can be summarized as follows.
1) The applicability of integrity checking methods is broadened
significantly. ITIC allows updates to be fruitfully checked for
integrity preservation even in the presence of inconsistency.
2) The application of ITIC tends to reduce the amount of
inconsistency. In particular, ITIC guarantees that the number of
violated basic cases cannot increase. Therefore, insertions cannot
increase the percentage of inconsistency in the data either.
3) ITIC tends to improve the quality of answers to queries.
Experimentally, we have shown that lower amounts of inconsis-
tency obtained with ITIC typically result in lower amounts of false
positives and negatives.
4) Procedural constructs for integrity maintenance can be
avoided. Many applications do not comply with the demand
of total integrity. Thus, instead of using methods for checking
declarative constraints, application programmers often have re-
sorted to less reliable procedural constructs, such as dynamic
constraints, triggers or stored procedures. The results of this paper
now legitimize the use of methods for ITIC, since their output is
reliable also in the presence of inconsistency.
Future work includes further investigation of the interplay be-
tween the notion of inconsistency-tolerant repair, as introduced in
V-B, and CQA. Instead of referring to total repairs for answering
a query, as CQA does, it should be sufficient to be content with
partial repairs that tolerate inconsistencies that do not “interfere”
with the query. This would also mean that CQA could even deal
with unsatisfiable theories without trivializing query answers (by
definition, every n-tuple is in the CQA answer to an n-ary query
if no repair exists).
Other pending work concerns inconsistency measures, as men-
tioned in Section VII. Acceptance of updates by an ITIC method
depends on the measure in use, which, in this paper, is based
on cases. Other measures may prove relevant for ITIC [10]. We
also intend to investigate the capacity of inconsistency tolerance
of abduction-based procedures, such as those described in [29].
Further ongoing studies are concerned with ITIC for concurrent
transactions and replicated databases.
To conclude, we believe that the notion of ITIC can be em-
braced by producers and vendors of DBMSs at no additional cost
in most of the existing implementations. Thus, the problematic use
of triggers and other non-declarative constructs can be reduced
in favor of ITIC, which is more useful and more reliable than
methods that insist on total integrity.
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